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Three years have passed since the Congress of 1996 imposed compre-
hensive restrictions on the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) and its law-
yers who provide free representation to the nation's poor in civil legal
matters. As legal services programs around the nation struggle to carry
out their mission to provide high quality legal representation, the restric-
tions continue to cause real harm to the individuals and communities that
rely on legal services lawyers. Injustices that cannot be addressed; clients
who cannot be represented; precious funds raised through strenuous ef-
forts that must be squandered on duplicative rent, furniture, and com-
puters; and attorneys' fees that must be forfeited, are all the subject of
this Paper.
In this Paper, I first describe my own experience as a legal services at-
torney in attempting to represent clients fully despite LSC's demand,
based on the restrictions, that I either abandon them or forfeit my job. I
then describe the circumstances of other legal services lawyers in Ore-
gon, Virginia,2 and Florida3 who are endeavoring to provide high-quality
legal representation to their clients while complying rigorously with the
requirements embodied in the restrictions. In assessing these stories, it is
t The author is Deputy Director of the Brennan Center for Justice at the New York Uni-
versity School of Law, Director of the Brennan Center's Poverty Program, a former Legal
Services attorney, and currently one of the counsel for the plaintiffs in Velazquez v. Legal Serv-
ices Corporation, a pending lawsuit that challenges the legal services restrictions on constitu-
tional grounds. See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), appeal
pending (argued March 20, 1998). The author thanks Valerie J. Bogart, Edwin Lopez-Soto,
Joshua Rosenkranz, Jonathan A. Weiss, Alan Houseman, and the attorneys identified in foot-
notes 1-3 who helped to author this article.
1. The section of this article describing legal services in Oregon is based on information
provided by Ira Zarov, Executive Director, Oregon Legal Services-Multnomah County Legal
Aid Service, Inc. (OLS-MCLAS), and Richard C. Baldwin, Executive Director, Oregon Law
Center.
2. The section of this article describing Legal Services in Virginia is based on information
provided by Alex R. Gulotta, Executive Director, Charlottesville-Albemarle Legal Aid Society
(CALAS), and Robert S. Stevens, Executive Director, Piedmont Legal Services, Inc.
3. The section of this article describing Legal Services in Florida was authored by Peter
Helwig, Executive Director, and Steve Hitov, Managing Attorney, Florida Rural Legal Serv-
ices.
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useful first to consider the scope of the restrictions and the response of
LSC programs nationally following their enactment.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE RESTRICTIONS
A. The Restrictions
The restrictions prohibit LSC lawyers from handling voter redistrict-
ing claims, initiating legislative advocacy, initiating or participating in
class actions, providing training to advance particular public policies,
handling abortion-related litigation, representing incarcerated persons,
representing certain aliens, challenging welfare reform legislation, de-
fending public housing residents in certain eviction cases where substance
abuse is alleged, claiming attorneys' fees, and soliciting clients.4
Congress made these restrictions applicable to all programs that re-
ceive LSC funds. Thus, legal services programs are forbidden to engage
in the restricted activities regardless of whether such activities are sup-
ported with federal LSC funds, or with other non-LSC funds raised from
sources such as state appropriations, attorney filing fees, private founda-
tions, or other private donors.
B. The Program Integrity Regulation
LSC, recognizing the force of constitutional challenges to the restric-
tions as applied to non-LSC funds, issued a "program integrity regula-
tion" in 1997 that loosened the hold of the restrictions on non-LSC
funds.' Under the regulation, an LSC program that wishes to use its non-
LSC funds to engage in restricted activities may enter into a relationship
with a non-LSC organization, which is then free to use the LSC pro-
gram's non-LSC funds to conduct the restricted activities. So long as the
LSC program retains "objective integrity and independence" from the
affiliate organization, LSC will not penalize the LSC program for activi-
ties of the affiliate that would otherwise be subject to the restrictions.
To measure whether an LSC program has retained "objective integ-
rity and independence" from the other organization, LSC considers
whether the two organizations are "legally separate," whether the non-
LSC organization received any LSC funds, and whether the organizations
are "physically and financially separate." To measure whether the pro-
grams are "physically and financially separate," LSC considers whether
the organizations have separate personnel, separate accounting and
4. See Pub. L. No. 104-134 § 504(a)(1), (2)-(4), (7), (11)-(18) (1996).
5. 45 C.F.R. § 1610.8(a) (1998).
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timekeeping records, and separate physical facilities. LSC also considers
whether the programs use adequate signs and other forms of identifica-
tion to distinguish the organizations from each other. LSC also considers
the extent of the restricted activities in which the non-LSC organization
6engages.
C. Responses of Legal Services Programs to the Restrictions
Following enactment of the restrictions, LSC required all programs to
transfer or withdraw from cases in the categories prohibited by the re-
strictions. Press accounts at the time suggest that approximately 600 cases
were disposed of in some way. While many cases were transferred to eli-
gible counsel,7 or brought by their legal services counsel to new settings
where further representation was permitted, some cases did not find eli-
gible counsel and were discontinued. In one conspicuous class action, the
class was decertified and the case dismissed when a search for substitute
counsel, conducted with the help of the American Bar Association's Pro
Bono Institute, proved fruitless.8
Two comprehensive lawsuits were ultimately filed against LSC chal-
lenging the restrictions on constitutional grounds-one seeking complete
rescission of the restrictions9 and the other seeking rescission of the re-
strictions as applied to non-federal funds.'0
As an alternative to withdrawing from representation in matters pro-
hibited under the restrictions, some legal services lawyers filed motions
seeking judicial orders to clarify whether they were obligated to with-
draw or to continue as counsel." Part II of this Paper sets forth my own
story as a legal services lawyer who was the subject of a series of such
motions filed in cases pending in New York State.
Two legal services programs sought to preserve their ability to handle
restricted matters by establishing affiliate relationships with non-LSC
programs pursuant to LSC's program integrity regulation. This Paper, in
Parts III and IV, sets forth the stories of these two programs which are
located in Oregon and Virginia. Both programs describe tremendous
6. See id.
7. For example, Florida Rural Legal Services was able to transfer some cases to the ACLU
Foundation of Florida. See infra note 45.
8. See Dugas v. Hoffpauir, No. Civ. A. 93-1699, Memorandum Order (W.D. La., Oct. 24,
1996).
9. Legal Aid Soc'y of Hawaii v. Legal Servs. Corp., 981 F. Supp. 1288 (D. Haw. 1997), affd,
145 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, No. 98-296,1998 U.S. LEXIS 7588 (Nov. 30,1998).
10. See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), appeal argued
Mar. 20, 1998.
11. See, e.g., Varshavsky v. Perales, No. 40767191, slip op. (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, Dec. 24,
1996).
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burdens encountered in complying with the restrictions and the criteria in
the program integrity regulation.
Many legal services programs have been limited to handling only
those matters still permitted under the restrictions. Some operate under
statewide networks in which other organizations supported with non-
LSC funds are attempting to handle restricted work. Some operate in
states in which there are no other unrestricted organizations possessing
non-LSC funds. In Part V, this Paper explains how Florida Rural Legal
Services, an organization funded exclusively by LSC, has sought to pro-
vide high quality representation while complying fully with the restric-
tions. Florida Rural's report illuminates the problems that the restrictions
present even in a state in which an independent "companion delivery sys-
tem," supported with non-LSC funds, attempts to handle matters that
would be prohibited under the restrictions.
II. NEW YORK
My own experience illuminates certain deeply troubling aspects of the
restrictions. When the restrictions were enacted in 1996, I was an attor-
ney at Legal Services for the Elderly,12 in New York City, serving as lead
counsel in four class action suits. LSC initially took the position that my
continued role as counsel in each case was barred by the restriction that
prohibits "initiating or participating in a class action.' ' 13 In three of these
cases, my role at the time was minimal, but not unimportant; I was moni-
toring implementation of final remedial orders that years earlier had re-
solved the merits of the claims. In the fourth case, the merits had not yet
been resolved and trial was scheduled.
The three cases in the implementation phase were all class action suits
against the Social Security Administration (SSA). The first case, Ken-
drick v. Sullivan,4 had been brought by disabled and elderly Social Secu-
rity applicants and recipients who alleged that a particular Administra-
tive Law Judge was unfit and biased against all Social Security claimants.
A formal settlement of this case, approved in 1996, called for SSA to re-
open all adverse Social Security decisions that the judge had rendered
since her appointment in 1977.
12. Legal Services for the Elderly (LSE) receives LSC funds through Legal Services for
New York City (LSNY), an umbrella organization that in turn receives funds from LSC. LSE
also receives substantial non-federal funds. My salary at LSE was funded entirely by revenues
from a New York State appropriation supporting advocacy on behalf of Social Security claim-
ants.
13. Pub. L. No. 104-134 § 504(a)(7) (1996).
14. 784 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (certifying class and denying motion to dismiss), subse-
quent settlement sub. nom., Kendrick v. Shalala (unpublished).
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The second case in the implementation phase, New York v. Sullivan,
15
had been brought by a similar class of disabled plaintiffs who challenged
SSA's disability rules on the ground that they placed excessive reliance
on the results of "treadmill tests" when determining disability based on
ischemic heart disease. A district court order granting summary judgment
to the plaintiffs, affirmed on appeal, required the agency to reopen all
denials and terminations of class members' benefits.
The third case in the implementation phase, Stieberger v. Apfel,16 was
brought by Social Security claimants who alleged that SSA's policy of
"non-acquiescence"-the agency's systematic disregard for circuit court
holdings (in this case, Second Circuit disability holdings)-had caused
class members' benefit claims to be unlawfully denied and terminated. A
formal settlement of this case called for the agency to reopen many thou-
sands of benefit decisions and to implement a system to require agency
decisionmakers to follow Second Circuit holdings.
In the fourth case, Robinson v. Chater,17 the merits were still at issue
when the restrictions were enacted. The plaintiffs in Robinson were dis-
abled and elderly people who were in desperate circumstances because of
the failure of SSA and Treasury to replace vital benefit payments (in
some cases amounting to thousands of dollars) that had been lost, stolen,
or destroyed. The plaintiffs alleged that SSA and Treasury were engaging
in outrageous delays when responding to their claims for replacement of
missing benefit payments. Many had been waiting for several years.
When the restrictions became effective, the case had been scheduled for
trial.
Although LSC insisted that my office immediately discontinue all in-
volvement in class actions, I submitted a "conditional motion to with-
draw" to each court, pursuant to the courts' local rules,18 rather than sim-
ply abandon my duties to my clients. In the motions, I requested rulings
on the constitutionality of the restrictions, explaining that if the restric-
tions were determined to be constitutional, then I would request leave to
withdraw, but also explaining that if the restrictions were found unconsti-
tutional then withdrawal would be inappropriate as it would prejudice
my clients.
Although I submitted each motion in advance of the August 1, 1996
effective date of the restrictions, LSC paid little heed to my efforts to ob-
tain judicial rulings. Instead LSC continued to insist that any continued
15. 906 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1990).
16. No. 95 Civ. 5622, 1998 WL 556156 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1998).
17. No. 94 Civ. 0057, 1996 WL 5067 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1996).
18. General Rules, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
Rule 3(e) (requiring counsel seeking withdrawal to obtain leave of the court).
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involvement in the cases on my part violated the restrictions. While the
motions were still pending, LSC notified LSNY19 of "a preliminary de-
termination" to suspend all funds for LSC programs in New York City as
of September 1, 1997 as a consequence of my, and my colleagues', role in
these and three other cases." LSNY then notified my office that it would
fire all of our employees.
21
Following these deeply disturbing threats, my motions and LSC's re-
sponse to them led to the following surprising resolutions. In the three
cases in which the merits had been resolved, LSC simply backed down.
Although the class action restriction expressly prohibits "initiating or par-
ticipating" in class actions, LSC explained that its implementing regula-
tion carves out a "safe harbor" for LSC lawyers whose involvement in
class actions is "non-adversarial."' In each of the three resolved suits,
LSC sent me a formal letter acknowledging that my monitoring role fell
within this safe harbor. On this basis, I was able to continue as counsel in
all three cases. Unfortunately, LSC's safe harbor regulation was not
promulgated until August 13, 1996, and thus many advocates across the
country withdrew prematurely from analogous cases in which they served
as class counsel, based on the belief that withdrawal was required. 2
While the safe harbor regulation solved the immediate crisis in these
three cases, it ultimately turned out to provide little in the way of real se-
curity. After LSC issued its letter acknowledging that my role in Stie-
berger, the nonacquiescence case, was within the safe harbor, I subse-
quently brought to the court's attention the SSA's circulation to
employees of a document that I believed violated the settlement. The
document seemingly instructed agency employees to disregard Circuit
Court precedents. The defendant's counsel (a lawyer in the federal pro-
grams branch of the Department of Justice) reported my action to LSC.
LSC then declared that my letter to the court was "adversarial" and or-
dered me off the case on pain of defunding all legal services programs in
New York City, even though the merits of the underlying case had been
resolved years earlier. Following a conference with the court, with LSC
entering an appearance, the dispute over the settlement's implementa-
tion was resolved by stipulation, with the court observing that there was
19. LSNY is the umbrella organization for all LSC funded programs in New York City.
20. See Today's News, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 1996, at 1.
21. See Today's News, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 15, 1996, at 1.
22. 45 C.F.R. § 1617.2(b)(2) (providing that "Initiating or participating in any class action
does not include.., non-adversarial activities").
23. See Legal Services Corporation, 61 Fed. Reg. 41,963 (1996) (interim rule, effective
Aug.13, 1996), modified by 61 Fed. Reg. 63,754 (1996) (final rule, effective Dec. 2, 1996) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1617). The text of LSC's interim and final rules does not clearly define
the boundaries of the safe harbor. LSC's agreement to permit continued monitoring was ob-
tained in negotiations to settle the conditional motions to withdraw.
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no actual adversarial dispute between the parties. LSC insisted that my
pay be docked for my court appearance, but then permitted me to re-
sume my monitoring role, again, in light of the non-adversarial resolution
of the matter and the safe harbor regulatory provision.
The controversy concerning the fourth case, Robinson, could not be
resolved by reliance on the safe harbor provision since the merits were
still in dispute and the case was scheduled for trial. LSC demanded that I
either abandon the case altogether or assume part-time status to handle
the matter elsewhere without LSC resources. The court provisionally
granted my conditional motion to withdraw, ordering me removed from
the case temporarily but reserving the right to reinstate me as counsel if
no substitute could be found before the upcoming trial.
At a subsequent conference, the remaining counsel on the case in-
formed the court that the only substitute willing to take the case would
need to request an adjournment to prepare for the trial . The court then
ordered me back on the case, but declined to bar LSC from taking action
to sanction me or my colleagues in legal services offices across the city.
Since the court had both ordered me to continue as counsel and declined
to protect me from retaliation by LSC, I had no choice but to accept part-
time employment on LSC's terms.2 LSC flatly refused my proposal to
handle the case on accrued vacation time, which would have permitted
me to avoid assuming part-time status. LSC instead took the position that
the restrictions applied to me so long as I was employed in my legal serv-
ices office as a full-time attorney. As a result I assumed part-time status,
accepted a cut in salary, accepted a cut in the rate at which I would con-
tinue to accrue annual leave time, accepted the risk that LSC (or LSNY)
might object to my eventual full-time reinstatement, and proceeded to
handle Robinson as a volunteer working out of office space donated by a
local law school. This difficult arrangement forced me to split my time be-
tween my legal services office and the law school clinic.
Eventually, Robinson was settled on the eve of trial on terms favor-
able to the plaintiffs.26 As soon as the court preliminarily approved the
24. Co-counsel in the case-the Greater Upstate Law Project (GULP), a program that de-
clined further LSC funding when the restrictions were enacted-stated that additional counsel
was essential in Robinson for a variety of reasons, including the complexity of the case and
GULP's distance from New York City. The Legal Aid Society of New York appeared in court
and stated that, if an adjournment were granted, it would undertake representation in conjunc-
tion with pro bono counsel.
25. A separate conditional motion to withdraw, fied by my LSE colleague, Valerie Bogart,
in a separate case, Varshavsky v. Perales, led to a different result. The court in that case directed
Iis. Bogart to remain on the case and enjoined LSC from taking any punitive action until the
motion could be fully adjudicated. Ultimately, the Varshavsky court declared the restriction on
class actions unconstitutional as applied to Ms. Bogart. See Varshavsky v. Perales, No. 40767/91,
slip op. (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, Dec. 24,1996).
26. The settlement agreement provided for the Treasury and SSA to employ new proce-
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proposed settlement in Robinson, I notified LSC that the case had en-
tered a non-adversarial posture and explained I was eligible for rein-
statement as a full time LSE employee under the safe harbor provision. I
then returned to full-time status. However, once again, the safe harbor
proved insecure. I made the "mistake" of writing to the court to resolve a
minor dispute over the date on which notice of the Robinson settlement
should be mailed to the class members and over the notice's content. The
government's lawyer (an Assistant United States Attorney in the South-
ern District of New York), sent my letter to LSC. LSC then cited the
"dispute," slight as it was, as reason again to find that I was engaging in
"adversarial" activity in violation of the class action restriction. LSC
again ordered me to withdraw from the case on pain of defunding all le-
gal services programs in New York City. LSC relented only after receiv-
ing letters from the district court judge and a supervisor in the U.S. At-
torney's office, both explaining that there was no genuine adversarial
dispute. Eventually the court approved the case settlement.
Several themes emerge from these chaotic proceedings. First, while
LSC-when pressed-will permit attorneys to monitor implementation
of class action remedial orders, LSC's seeming toleration of this work ac-
tually provides little real security. At any turn, an adversary may knock
the LSC lawyer off the case by reporting to LSC that the lawyer is en-
gaged in adversarial activities, even if the merits are fully resolved and
the dispute is over scheduling or other details.
More troubling is the threat of such an attack when the LSC lawyer
catches and reports an opposing party's genuine non-compliance with a
final remedial order. LSC, which must answer to a frequently hostile
Congress, has a hair trigger in such matters and may demand that an LSC
lawyer withdraw from a case even if, as noted above, the merits are fully
resolved and the dispute is solely over compliance with the court's order.
Since it is very difficult to find substitute counsel willing to inherit the
complex responsibility of monitoring a resolved past suit, and since many
legal services offices have played an essential role as monitors of reme-
dial orders in such cases, the chilling effect of the restrictions on class ac-
tion monitoring is especially problematic. 27
dures so that, when New York claimants request replacement of missing Social Security pay-
ments, they will no longer have to wait for the completion of the government's lengthy investi-
gative proceedings before receiving replacement of their missing payment. Under the new set-
tlement procedures, the government will issue the replacement payment before beginning the
investigation. After the replacement payment is issued, the government will conduct its investi-
gation and will later seek reimbursement if it determines that the claimant did not deserve the
replacement payment.
27. LSC's actions have been chilling in other respects. For example, LSNY has so far
sought to hold my Legal Services employer, LSE, responsible for attorneys' fees expended by
LSNY in defending the motions I filed, even though those motions asserted fundamental consti-
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LSC has recently persuaded the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in Legal Aid Society of Hawaii that the part-time em-
ployment arrangement in Robinson somehow demonstrates that LSC will
apply its "program integrity regulation" in a flexible manner and will
make careful case-by-case determinations as to whether any particular
sharing arrangement violates the requirement of "physical and financial
separation" set forth in the regulation.28
But such a conclusion is not justified-in fact LSC seems wed to rig-
idly applying the regulations. Nor is part-time employment a viable ad-
ministrative option for LSC programs since part-time employees have
reduced health, pension, vacation rights, salary, and overall job security,
and LSC forces them to operate out of physically separate offices. When
part-time employment occurs in a separate office, as the LSC program
integrity regulation requires, it becomes much more difficult for lawyers
to provide effective representation. For example, telephone messages
must be returned from separate locations; clients only can be seen and
represented on certain days; time is wasted on travel between offices;
collegial duties must go unmet. Even if part-time employment could pro-
vide a marginally acceptable solution where counsel is handling a single
specific case during a specific segment of time (as in Robinson), the bur-
dens become much more unbearable where counsel is responsible for
multiple matters. While part-time employment served as a stop-gap
measure to resolve a distracting crisis in Robinson, it does not offer a
programmatic solution and does not demonstrate that LSC will apply its
program integrity regulation in ways that are genuinely flexible. LSC has
not shown any willingness to relax the program integrity requirement of
physical separation. In Robinson, LSC's insistence on this requirement
was absolute.29
Finally, the arrangement in Robinson was one between an LSC-
funded office and an entirely separate law school clinic. The LSC pro-
gram had no control over the litigation of the case and no opportunity to
preserve its First Amendment rights through the arrangement. LSC's ac-
tions in Robinson also do not suggest that LSC would tolerate any
greater overlap between organizations that share a part-time employee
tutional fights, even though three of the motions were settled on terms that allowed me to con-
tinue as counsel for my clients, and even though the fourth motion led to a court order requiring
me to continue as counsel.
28. See Legal Aid Soc'y of Hawaii v. Legal Servs. Corp., 145 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 1998)
(indicating the court's reliance on an affidavit from LSC's general counsel describing my part-
time arrangement in Robinson).
29. Nor did my employer, LSE, possess sufficient resources to enable it to decline LSC
funding or to finance the litigation out of a separate office as contemplated under the program
integrity regulation.
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engaged in restricted work in one organization and unrestricted work in
the other organization.
III. OREGON30
The LSC restrictions have imposed difficult burdens on the programs
that provide legal representation to Oregon's poor. These programs op-
erate with seriously understaffed offices, an urgent need for additional
funds, and the recognition that the restrictions prevent many forms of
advocacy that in previous years proved essential to fully protecting cli-
ents' rights.
A. History
Before 1996, each of the fourteen offices of Oregon Legal Services
(OLS) did work that is now prohibited. Advocates routinely sought at-
torneys' fees, undertook class actions, lobbied administrative agencies
and local governments, challenged welfare laws, and represented un-
documented workers. The Oregon Legal Services philosophy, recorded
in the program's statement of principles, had always been for attorneys to
handle a significant number of individual cases while also taking on proj-
ects with a broader impact on clients. Under this directive, fully a third of
the work focused on legal reform, leaving a significant legacy of cases.
For example, in the past, Oregon Legal Services was responsible for
writing and lobbying the Family Abuse Prevention Act, which provides
protection to victims of domestic violence, and for ensuring enforcement
of that Act through the courts. OLS represented the Oregon Coalition
Against Sexual and Domestic Violence in the legislature and also repre-
sented the interests of United Seniors. On a local level, OLS frequently
represented clients and client groups in local government forums, arguing
"not in my backyard" (NIMBY) issues that arose around development
and placement of low-income housing. For example, OLS successfully
lobbied Congress to obtain formal recognition of Indian tribes that had
been "terminated" in the 1950s. This effort enabled many tribes to be-
come self-governing and economically self-sufficient.
OLS also routinely worked with the state's service providers to design
adequate rules on a wide range of topics. Especially important exchanges
gave rise to rules to facilitate adoptions by low-income families, rules
concerning the implementation of Oregon's health plan, and rules con-
cerning the operation of work-fare and other related programs.
30. Information for this Part was provided by Ira Zarov, Executive Director, Oregon Legal
Services-Multnomah County Legal Aid Service, Inc., and Richard C. Baldwin, Executive Direc-
tor, Oregon Law Center. See supra note 1.
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OLS also litigated numerous class actions, including a case that chal-
lenged the state's failure to provide emergency psychological treatment
to eligible children. As a result of this lawsuit, several million dollars
were added to the state's Medicaid expenditures to develop new pro-
grams for disturbed children.
In another class action, OLS represented a class of low-income His-
panics against the Farmers Home Administration alleging that the
agency was improperly applying its loan criteria to class members and, as
a consequence, denying loans to eligible applicants. The settlement of
this lawsuit resulted in the infusion of millions of dollars in federal funds
for housing for class members. The settlement was monitored for a sub-
stantial number of years.
Other class actions included challenges to the state's method of de-
termining eligibility for Medicaid, challenges to the Immigration and
Naturalization Services' processing of a category of citizenship applica-
tions, numerous class actions concerning wages and working conditions
of migrants, and class actions against perpetrators of consumer fraud. In
one consumer fraud class action, the last such action filed and completed
prior to the restrictions, the challenged practice was an automobile "loan,
lease-buy back" scheme, directed at low-income individuals and the eld-
erly, that extracted loan interest payments of over 200% per year.
When it became clear that the LSC restrictions would be enacted, the
Oregon State Bar formed a task-force to examine potential responses.
Following the recommendations of the Bar's Taskforce Report, non-
federal funds formerly received by LSC programs statewide were di-
rected to establish a new organization, the Oregon Law Center (OLC).
The Center, located in Portland, is now the only office that has as its fo-
cal point the systemic reform work prohibited under the LSC restrictions.
On July 1, 1998, Oregon Legal Services (which had already consoli-
dated with another LSC recipient, Multnomah County Legal Aid Serv-
ice) changed its name to Legal Aid Services of Oregon (OLS-MCLAS)
and formally affiliated with the Oregon Law Center. The affiliation's
keystone was compliance with both the letter and spirit of LSC's
"program integrity regulation. 3 1 The two programs share a board of di-
rectors, though the boards have separate officers. They do not share staff
or office space. The Oregon Law Center receives no federal funds.32
31. 45 C.F.R. § 1610 (1998).
32. Also providing federally funded Legal Services in some of Oregon's smaller communi-
ties are Marion-Polk Legal Services, Inc., and Lane County Legal Services, Inc. Additionally,
the Center for Non-Profit Legal Services is a small, privately-funded provider of legal services
in Medford, Oregon.
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B. Current Concerns
In contrast to many states, substantial private and state funds have
been found in Oregon to support OLC's unrestricted work. Nevertheless,
the money does not begin to reach the levels necessary to continue all the
work historically done by Oregon Legal Services or to establish the net-
work of offices maintained by Oregon Legal Services. Despite the success
of Oregon's legal services community in fundraising, no one considers it
feasible to raise funds sufficient to establish such a network. Oregon Le-
gal Services' budget last year for the maintenance of thirteen offices was
approximately $4.5 million and the budget for Multnomah County Legal
Aid Services was $1.5 million. Funding for the unrestricted work of the
Oregon Law Center this year is only about $900,000.
The shared board of directors now establishes a link between the re-
stricted federally funded offices of OLS-MCLAS that are distributed
around the state and the unrestricted privately funded office of the Ore-
gon Law Center in Portland. Still, the board and the staff believe that any
further overlap might violate LSC's rules and endanger program funding.
Any assessment of legal services in Oregon should consider both
Oregon's tradition of providing free high quality legal representation and
the program integrity regulation which, because of the requirement of
physical separation, prevents the delivery of such representation to indi-
viduals living outside of Portland. It is clear that the difference in service
provision since enactment of the restrictions is stark. Consider, for exam-
ple, the legal needs of the residents of Ontario, Oregon, located east of
Boise, Idaho-a full time zone from Portland. The indigent population of
Ontario includes many undocumented migrant workers. OLS-MCLAS,
the only legal services provider within a radius of almost 200 miles (three
hours by car), has either two or three lawyers in its Ontario office, de-
pending on funding. The Oregon Law Center currently has insufficient
funds to establish an unrestricted legal services office in Ontario. As a
consequence, an undocumented worker with a housing problem, or trou-
ble with a grower, has no one to represent him or her. Similarly, as wel-
fare reform sweeps across Oregon, no one in Ontario can do an intake or
take a lawsuit for a welfare applicant seeking reform on any aspect of the
law. When disputes about where to place a sanitation plant or a transi-
tional residence for the mentally ill arise, OLS-MCLAS advocates cannot
so much as approach the city council or county commissioner that con-
trols such matters.
Even if funding were sufficient to allow "pairing" of offices, with the
Oregon Law Center taking over some of the OLS-MCLAS offices, and
with the other OLS-MCLAS offices remaining entirely funded by LSC
(and subject to the restrictions), such an approach would fail to represent
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adequately Oregon's poor because of the vast distances between towns.33
For example, Ontario is a three- to four-hour drive from the nearest
towns of Pendleton or Bend. The rest of the state poses the same prob-
lem. In the past, each federally funded office of Oregon Legal Services
dedicated a certain amount of non-federal funding to unrestricted work.
Given the "physically separate" mandate, it remains crucially important
for the Oregon Law Center to raise more money to extend its service to
other parts of the state. In addition, total available funds for the provision
of legal services are diluted because the parallel organizations must each
pay for duplicative management services, including executive directors,
accounting units, program administrators, auditing services, and more.
The state's new plan for indigent representation calls for the Oregon
Law Center to receive referrals from around the state, including from re-
gions like Ontario. The hope is that the staff at OLS-MCLAS and the
staff at the Oregon Law Center will see themselves as part of one larger
organization. Nevertheless, because the staff inhabit segregated offices,
the leadership of OLS-MCLAS and of the Oregon Law Center remain
concerned about whether it is possible to ensure adequate communica-
tion between programs. Oregon Legal Services used to conduct a series
of strategic meetings each year before the state legislative session. The
program would include many people from many different offices in a co-
ordinated effort to set priorities. Now, in light of the split, the annual
strategy session involves only the Portland staff of the Oregon Law Cen-
ter. While OLC tries to reach out to the satellite offices of OLS-MCLAS
to discern the priorities of remote communities, it is impossible to sustain
the level of involvement and excitement that was characteristic of the
legislative advocacy effort that preceded enactment of the restrictions.
Most perturbing is the possibility that over time the relationships be-
tween those doing legislative advocacy for the Oregon Law Center and
those in the field offices of OLS-MCLAS and other programs may be at-
tenuated still further. Breakdowns in communication are difficult to pre-
vent when face-to-face meetings are infrequent and when advocates un-
derstandably are anxious to avoid interactions that could be perceived as
violating the restrictions.
OLS-MCLAS recognizes that technological advances can help ad-
dress some problems posed by underfunded and understaffed offices, a
large client base, and vast distances. Videotelephones, hotlines, pro se
centers, and other devices all have great promise, especially for handling
simple matters or for advising clients on how to help themselves when
33. Oregon has two major mountain ranges that run north-south through the state making
winter travel difficult and dangerous.
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self-help is an option. Still, none of the technological advances are a real
substitute for the vigorous lawyering that OLS-MCLAS advocates his-
torically offered. OLS-MCLAS strongly believes that to be effective, it
remains crucial to have a presence in the community: clients need a place
to meet, and advocates need to participate directly in issues confronting
the community.
Finally, OLS-MCLAS is concerned about the long-term potential for
morale problems. While OLS-MCLAS staff are devoted to providing ef-
fective representation to their clients, it is increasingly demoralizing for
staff to confront the many critical opportunities for client advocacy that
are now completely precluded. In the past, Oregon Legal Services advo-
cates, on behalf of their clients, had an important say in the affairs of the
community. Now this access and influence has been severely curtailed.
OLS-MCLAS also must be increasingly concerned about whether these
limitations on the practice of law eventually will make it difficult to at-
tract and retain attorneys.
IV. VIRGINIA'
The LSC program in Charlottesville, Virginia was the first in the na-
tion to enter into the arrangement of "physical and financial separation"
that is contemplated in LSC's program integrity regulation. This section
focuses on documenting the costs-direct and indirect, financial and hu-
man-that any LSC program must confront in seeking to satisfy this
regulation.
When the LSC restrictions were enacted, long-time LSC provider
Charlottesville-Albemarle Legal Aid Society (CALAS) embarked on the
following plan to preserve its capacity to engage in unrestricted advocacy.
CALAS declined receipt of further LSC funds. At the same time it fos-
tered formation of Piedmont Legal Services, a new organization with
staff previously employed by CALAS, to apply for the LSC funds that
would otherwise have gone to CALAS. LSC authorized the funding of
Piedmont for one year. Piedmont, as a new recipient of LSC funds, be-
came subject to the LSC restrictions. CALAS did not. Piedmont and
CALAS share a single board of directors.
A. Basic Terms of the CALAS-Piedmont Affiliate Relationship
While CALAS and Piedmont share a single board of directors, they
are separate in almost all other respects. Each organization is a separate
34. Information for this Part was provided by Alex R. Gulotta, Executive Director, Char-
lottesville-Albemarle Legal Aid Society (CALAS), and Robert S. Stevens, Executive Director,
Piedmont Legal Services. See supra note 2.
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tax entity and has its own executive director. The organizations share no
case-handling staff. CALAS employs four and one-half attorneys, one
and one-half paralegals, and two support staff. Piedmont employs two
and one-half attorneys, one paralegal, and a part time support person.
Each organization maintains its own accounting and timekeeping records
and separate office space. Piedmont is in a building around the corner
from CALAS. The offices are on separate computer networks.
B. The Costs Involved in Establishing and Maintaining the Affiliate
Relationship
1. Time and Energy
The costs imposed by the LSC restrictions and by the task of compli-
ance with the program integrity regulation are substantial even if not
easily quantifiable. Certain financial expenses are known, such as dupli-
cative payments of rent and machine repair. More difficult to quantify is
the effort involved in setting up and operating within the new affiliate
relationship. The following examples help illuminate some of the costs.
Creating the new affiliate relationship required a huge time commit-
ment from staff at both organizations. The process took almost a year.
During this extended period the executive director of CALAS, and the
CALAS attorney who later became executive director of Piedmont,
dedicated substantial time to this process that otherwise would have been
committed to handling substantive work for clients.
For example, the directors had many conversations with employees of
LSC in Washington, D.C. to gain an unofficial sense of whether LSC
would likely approve the proposed arrangement. Substantial staff time
was also necessary to establish Piedmont as a separate 501(c)(3) non-
profit corporation, though local lawyers donated some time to this task.
It also took time to conduct the lengthy negotiations necessary to pre-
serve health insurance, seniority, and pension rights for the Piedmont
employees.
The executive director of Piedmont expended considerable time en-
suring that Piedmont would be in full compliance with the LSC restric-
tions and all other requirements including the program integrity re-
quirement. Simply compiling the relevant statutes and regulations,
learning their content, and establishing office policies took thirty to forty
hours.
The process of creating Piedmont was also emotionally wrenching.
CALAS had to decide which members of a close-knit staff should go to
the new organization. Difficult choices had to be made about who would
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do restricted or unrestricted work and about the best way to divide up
the categories of legal work. Extensive discussions led to a decision to
handle all family law and bankruptcy cases at Piedmont since that office
was barred from collecting attorneys' fees and such cases generate rela-
tively few fee claims. But despite some advantages, CALAS and Pied-
mont do not find the arrangement entirely satisfactory since Piedmont
lawyers cannot engage in legislative advocacy that is sometimes quite im-
portant to their clients' cases.
2. Money
Piedmont's new computer network cost about $10,000. The existing
server at CALAS could have served both Piedmont and CALAS, but the
programs chose not to share the server because of concern about satisfy-
ing LSC's program integrity regulation. CALAS and Piedmont both be-
lieved that LSC would have found shared reliance on a single computer
network to be a violation of the requirements of physical separation. Ex-
pense also was incurred when CALAS had to buy new furniture and
equipment after donating a substantial amount of existing furniture and
equipment to Piedmont pursuant to an LSC ruling that authorized such
donations.
In establishing Piedmont, CALAS paid Piedmont's employees the
amount representing their accrued leave time as indicated in CALAS's
books. Absent the need to establish the new affiliate relationship, this
amount would have remained on CALAS's books and been payable only
when the staff eventually left the employment of CALAS. Thus, while
these payments did not constitute a new financial liability, their payment
as lump sums was necessitated solely by creation of the new affiliate rela-
tionship.
The two physically and financially separate offices generate addi-
tional administrative work and cost, including the substantial expense of
salaries for two executive directors.
Piedmont was required to purchase new case management software.
This expense was relatively modest because the software was discounted
dramatically by its creator (John Kemp), who reduced the fee (from
$1700 to $200) to support Piedmont's creation.
CALAS was forced to forego claiming approximately $25,000 in at-
torneys' fees in one case last year solely because of the LSC restrictions
that bar LSC programs from collecting fees. The fees were a product of
CALAS's successful litigation in a consumer law case. When plaintiffs
prevailed, CALAS was barred from collecting its statutory attorneys'
fees as the separation had not been completed. In another case now
pending, Piedmont is serving as co-counsel with CALAS since the clients
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had been working with a CALAS attorney who moved to Piedmont, and
they wanted to continue this relationship. If the case goes to trial and the
plaintiffs prevail, the work by Piedmont will likely generate $10,000 to
$20,000 in fees that it will be forbidden to collect.35
Rent is probably the most wasteful aspect of maintaining dual offices.
Piedmont was fortunate to obtain a $1000 per month lease. Inexpensive
for the Charlottesville area, this $12,000 per year cost nevertheless is oc-
casioned solely by the "physical separation" requirement. Piedmont and
CALAS, based on their negotiations with LSC, concluded it was essential
for the two programs to have entirely separate offices with separate en-
trances and no sharing of keys. The cost of telephone service at Pied-
mont's separate office included approximately $3000 for an initial hook
up and includes an additional $2500 each year.
Piedmont employs its own receptionist because of the physical sepa-
ration requirement.
Piedmont and CALAS each pay for separate audits that each year
cost $3500 per program. Before the forced separation, only one audit was
necessary for a total cost of $4000.
3. The Future
While Piedmont and CALAS would benefit enormously from sharing
computers, office space, and staff, the organizations have concluded that
such an arrangement is entirely out of bounds from LSC's perspective.
The degree of separation in the final arrangement between CALAS and
Piedmont reflects months of deliberation with frequent efforts to obtain
LSC's feedback and approval. Thus, the final arrangement reflects LSC's
deliberate input, and neither program anticipates creating any additional
overlap.
CALAS and Piedmont have tried to spend their limited resources,
particularly the restricted federal LSC funds, as rationally as possible.
Thus, the offices divide the categories of work so that Piedmont handles
the cases least affected by the attorneys' fee restriction: family court and
bankruptcy cases. Piedmont also runs a pro bono intake hotline staffed
by volunteer lawyers for four half-days each week. The hotline refers to
CALAS such cases as federally subsidized housing evictions, denials of
federally subsidized housing, representation of tenant organizations,
public benefits cases, special education cases, employment discrimina-
35. The case is a lawsuit against a car dealer who sold a car based on the representation
that the car had been driven 73,000 miles instead of 173,000. The car dealer took advantage of
certain intellectual limitations of the buyers, a married couple who are now the clients of
CALAS-Piedmont.
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tion, migrant worker representation, consumer law cases, and representa-
tion of juveniles with legal conflicts. CALAS has also obtained certain
new grants that have helped it meet its expenses. One grant provides for
CALAS to represent juveniles. Another, funded with IOLTA (Interest
on Lawyers' Trust Accounts) revenues, provides $95,000 for migrant rep-
resentation. CALAS also has received a grant in collaboration with the
Public Service Center at the University of Virginia School of Law to
handle special education cases and other child advocacy matters. CALAS
also is involved in an employment clinic program at the law school. While
these grants and programs have been important in sustaining the critical
mass of the organization, CALAS notes that the specialized purpose of
the funds also means the office does less work in the traditional areas of
housing and consumer law.
CALAS presently continues to engage in legislative advocacy, par-
ticularly over tenants' issues. CALAS seeks and collects attorneys' fees in
cases where fees are available. CALAS is also considering undertaking
certain class actions. When the restrictions were enacted, attorneys at
CALAS were in the investigation stage of two potential class actions. In
light of the enactment of the restrictions, CALAS settled both cases be-
fore filing. While CALAS considers the two settlements fair for the indi-
vidual plaintiffs, it notes that the intense pressure to avoid handling cases
in violation of the LSC restrictions precluded lawyers from further devel-
oping potential claims on behalf of the possible class.
Both CALAS and Piedmont have found it is difficult to fund-raise for
many categories of legal services work (for example, housing or con-
sumer law cases). However, a state appropriation-a filing fee of $2.00
per case that goes to legal services programs-and IOLTA funds have all
been enormously important in sustaining CALAS. The appropriation
from the state, however, has been modified over the years and has in
some years been dropped from the state budget. Significant segments of
the state are not particularly sympathetic to the need for legal represen-
tation for the poor. Recently a law firm has raised questions at the state
bar association concerning CALAS's role in suing a car dealer that is the
firm's client. The firm also made inquiries on behalf of a poultry proces-
sor about CALAS's migrant program.
The overall lack of funding for legal services in Virginia, and the
waste of funds on duplicative expenses, compounds the harm caused by
the restrictions. At both Piedmont and CALAS, support staff is in short
supply. It has also become much harder for programs to attract young at-
torneys and to retain experienced ones. In Charlottesville the starting
Legal Services salary is $24,700 while a public defender can earn up to
$31,000 and a prosecutor up to $35,000. Experienced attorneys find it in-
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creasingly difficult to support families when funding streams are under
constant attack and seem inherently unstable.
CALAS and Piedmont believe that most other legal services pro-
grams would not be interested in seeking to establish an affiliate relation-
ship based on the CALAS-Piedmont example even though no lawyer is
comfortable operating under the restrictions. While CALAS was able
through tremendous sustained effort to create and then affiliate with
Piedmont, it is plainly easier and less expensive for a single office pro-
gram like CALAS to duplicate itself than for other programs with multi-
ple offices to do so.
Other options for dedicating non-LSC funds to unrestricted work also
are unattractive. Programs are free to transfer their non-LSC funds to
other organizations, such as CALAS, or even the Virginia Poverty Law
Center in Richmond. The problem is that after any such transfer, unre-
stricted services will remain geographically inaccessible to clients in the
original service area where they are needed. Programs also are free to
decline LSC funding altogether (without necessarily entering into any af-
filiate relationship). Of course, surviving as an independent program in-
volves many of the same financial costs and risks incurred in creation of
affiliate relationship (as with CALAS-Piedmont) and poses the addi-
tional risk that over time the programs under separate management will
compete for funding.
Finally, the instability of funding for civil legal services also causes
many programs to hesitate before undertaking plans for dramatic reor-
ganization. While federal funds have remained available at a reduced
survival level, and while Virginia has been generous compared to some
states in providing unrestricted money, the overall funding flow has not
been sufficiently reliable, especially in certain regions, to assure that pro-
grams can meet ongoing expenses even if there could be enough start-up
money to establish "physically separate" programs.
V. FLORIDA36
With the benefit of two years' experience under the new restrictions,
it is clear that the LSC restrictions have had a profound effect on the sys-
tem of civil justice for the poor throughout this country and on the range
of options that Florida Rural Legal Services (Florida Rural) can offer to
its clients. Cases will arise, and have already arisen, where the most ap-
propriate remedy, and perhaps the only meaningful one, is now pro-
scribed.
36. Peter Helwig, Executive Director, Florida Rural Legal Services, and Steve Hitov, Man-
aging Attorney, Florida Rural Legal are the joint authors of this Part. See supra note 3.
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As 1995 drew to a close, Florida Rural found itself with a case docket
that included twenty class actions, seven voting rights cases, and over
four thousand clients who were not United States citizens. All these
cases, and most representation of the immigrant clients, would be im-
permissible under the 1996 legislation.37 In addition, the Florida Rural
legislative office in Tallahassee, as well as the impact immigration office
in Miami, would have to close.
In other areas, such as the restrictions on welfare reform advocacy
and voting rights (redistricting) litigation, the 1996 legislation has taken
away from the poor any opportunity for relief in a substantive area of
civil justice. In yet others, such as the restriction on claiming attorneys'
fees, it has altered the balance of power between attorneys for the poor
and attorneys for their opponents. And finally, for those such as ineligi-
ble immigrants, the 1996 legislation has eliminated representation en-
tirely.
Florida Rural's attempt to work with its clients, board, staff, unions,
and the larger community to develop a plan for referring cases, reducing
staff, closing specialty offices, and restructuring itself in this new envi-
ronment has been documented elsewhere. 39 The discussion here exam-
ines the real damage done by some of the newest restrictions, but also the
remaining capacity that the restructured legal system for the poor may
have to meet the needs of present and future clients.
A major player in the new system is the Florida Bar Foundation
which administers Florida's Interest on Trust Accounts (IOTA) pro-
gram.40 With the Foundation's support, a "companion delivery system"
has been established in an effort to carry on some of the work now pro-
37. The legislation was ultimately enacted and signed into law on April 26, 1996. Pub. L.
No. 104-134 § 504 (1996). For most purposes, the restrictions were effective immediately, al-
though an additional three months were given for divestiture of class actions, prisoner litigation,
and immigrant cases. See id.
38. Like the prior restriction on the use of LSC and private funds, see 45 C.FR. § 1632
(1998), the 1996 legislation prohibited advocacy related to redistricting and expressly permitted
a narrow class of advocacy which, though based on the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §
1971 (1994), did not involve redistricting. However, the significance of the 1996 legislation is
that, for the first time, it prohibited such advocacy regardless of the source of funds used to sup-
port it.
39. See LEGAL SERVICES (newsletter of the Florida legal services programs), Mar.-Apr.
1996, at 2.
40. IOTA or, more commonly, IOLTA (Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts), programs
are in operation in fifty states and the District of Columbia and use interest from pooled client
trust accounts held by attorneys to support various public purposes, including legal services to
the poor. Florida's IOTA program was the first in the nation, see In re Interest on Trust Ac-
counts, 356 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1978), and is one of the most productive, committing over ten mil-
lion dollars annually to civil legal services for the poor. However, a recent decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court has called the constitutionality of IOLTA programs into question. See Phillips v.
Washington Legal Foundation, 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998).
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hibited for LSC-funded programs. This system has been described in de-
tail elsewhere.41
While empirical data is lacking at this early date, it may fairly be sur-
mised that the companion system has provided the capacity to carry on
legislative and administrative advocacy at the state level, some impact
work for migrant farmworkers, a number of class actions in general pov-
erty law, and some immigration representation for non-citizens. How-
ever, no one would even suggest that the companion system has any
chance of filling the gaps created by the 1996 legislation. This reality
highlights what may well be the most crippling of the new restrictions: the
extension of LSC restrictions to non-LSC dollars. An exploration of that
problem follows.
A. The Elimination of Voting Rights Cases from the Civil Justice System
for the Poor
One of Florida Rural's most successful collaborations with clients and
community groups was its Voting Rights Project which was initiated with
a special IOTA grant in 1991. While many of Florida's coastal counties
have been desegregated over the last thirty years, discrimination in its
crudest forms still pervades many of the inland rural communities. Con-
ditions for minorities in large areas of rural Florida differ little from those
that preceded desegregation. One method of maintaining white ascen-
dance is to elect county commissioners and school board members on an
at-large basis. In such a system, minorities might comprise forty percent
of a county's population but be governed by a county commission con-
sisting of five white members, all elected in county-wide at-large elec-
tions.
The Florida Rural Voting Rights Project began in response to fre-
quent client complaints about discrimination and unresponsive govern-
ment in rural areas. Working with local community people, advocates
implemented a litigation strategy that would compel the creation of sin-
gle-member districts, each of which would elect its own county commis-
sioner. During the first half of the 1990s, they applied this strategy to
great effect. Even as the U.S. Supreme Court was deciding cases that
42limited the impact of the Voting Rights Act on Congressional districts,
the Florida Rural strategy continued to secure a string of successes for its
rural minority clients.
41. See LEGAL SERVICES (newsletter of the Florida Legal Services programs), Nov.-Dec.
1995, at 1.
42. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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In one typical case, the county's African-American population was
concentrated in an unincorporated area immediately adjacent to a sugar
cane processing plant. The community to this day is referred to as
"Harlem" on official highway maps. Though African Americans com-
prised seventeen percent of the county's population, an at-large election
system had prevented the election of any black representatives to the
five-person county commission or to the school board. Due to govern-
mental inattention and poverty, Harlem had the appearance of an im-
poverished third-world village. When the community did draw the atten-
tion of county government, it was to be selected as a candidate for a toxic
waste transfer facility. Community concern over the toxic waste proposal
and other issues reached a crescendo in 1991. In response, Florida Rural
filed suit under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 against the county commis-
sion and the school board. Before the end of the year, the county signed
a consent decree establishing single member districts. 43 Shortly thereafter,
the county's first African-American commissioner was elected from the
district that included Harlem. Before the new legislation halted this
work,44 similar results were obtained' or were in the process of being ob-
tained in other cases.46
Unfortunately, much work remains to be done in securing the rights
of Florida's rural minorities to full participation in the democratic proc-
ess. But Florida Rural now must turn away requests for such assistance.
It is anticipated that future requests will also come from Latino and Hai-
tian clients as more of them become part of the electorate. Currently, no
one in Florida is doing this work which is highly specialized, quite risky,
and expensive. Not confronting this ongoing problem, however, may ul-
timately prove even more costly.
B. The Exclusion of Poor Immigrants from the Civil Justice System
Another source of pride for Florida Rural has been its legal represen-
tation of immigrants. Florida is home to over two million non-citizens, 47 a
43. See Jesse Robinson v. Hendry County Bd. of Comm'rs, Civil Action No. 91-13-CIV-
FTM-3A20 (M.D. Fla. 1991), Docket Entry 1309.
44. Through an enormous expenditure of energy, good will, and some dollars, Florida Ru-
ral and the ACLU Foundation of Florida made arrangements for the latter to take over and
complete the voting rights cases pending when the new legislation took effect. However, there
are no plans to initiate new Florida cases, and ACLU counsel in the pending cases have been
moved to a regional office in Atlanta, Georgia.
45. See, e.g., Coleman v. Fort Pierce City Comm'n, Civil Action No. 92-14157-PAINE (S.D.
Fla. 1992) (approving a consent decree that enabled African Americans, who comprised forty-
two percent of the local population, to elect two of the five commissioners).
46. See, e.g., Johnson v. DeSoto County Sch. Bd., Civil Action No. 90-366-Civ-FTM-15D
(M.D. Fla. 1990).
47. A precise count of this population is not available. In the 1990 census, it was reported
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disproportionate number of whom are poor. Although representation of
many classes of immigrants had not been permitted with LSC funds since
the early 1980s, Florida Rural used IOTA money to offer representation
to all immigrants, "no questions asked." Over the years, Florida Rural's
racially and ethnically diverse staff, which included twenty-two Spanish
speakers and seven Creole speakers, worked with this isolated and vul-
nerable population. A track record of important impact cases, as well as
countless individual service cases, was built in areas such as employment,
housing, food stamps, immigration, education law, and farmworker
rights. However, when the 1996 legislation applied the LSC alien restric-
tion to IOTA funds, much of this work ended.4
The Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center provides high-quality repre-
sentation to many immigrants who can no longer be served by Florida
Rural. However, the wide variety of legal problems experienced by this
population not because they are immigrants, but because they are poor,
is now going largely unaddressed. 49 Florida Rural can no longer help
large numbers of immigrants with their routine civil legal problems. Thus
in tying LSC restrictions to non-LSC dollars, the 1996 legislation has left
us with a system that responds to immigrants only as immigrants, not as
people with the same legal needs as U.S. citizens.
C. Further Tipping the Scales of Justice Against the Poor
The prohibition on recovering attorneys' fees also has dramatically af-
fected the system of civil justice for the poor. The most obvious conse-
quence for legal services programs is loss of revenue. Florida Rural, for
example, received in excess of $2,000,000 in attorneys' fees during the
first half of the 1990s and used the money in part to buy a computer sys-
tem. The 1996 legislation has wiped out this substantial source of support
for legal services, appropriately financed by those who engaged in unlaw-
ful actions against poor people.
More importantly, the attorneys' fees ban has affected the balance of
rights and powers in civil litigation. In the past, parties wishing to bring
questionable legal actions against a poor person might be constrained by
that there were 1,662,601 foreign-born legal immigrants in Florida. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS, CP-3-1. This of course would not include undocumented immigrants and
those who have overstayed their visas.
48. The 1996 legislation permitted representation of permanent resident aliens (green card
holders) and certain other narrow classes of immigrants, but prohibited representation to many
aliens legally in this country, including asylum applicants. The legislation also denied represen-
tation to "undocumented" aliens. A Florida Rural study, conducted in 1996, came up with an
estimate of fifty-seven percent for the Florida migrant farmworker population.
49. Two single-county legal aid programs are attempting to fill this void, but their lack of
diverse bilingual staff and the absence of trust with the immigrant community bodes ill for the
success of this venture.
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the prospect of paying substantial attorneys' fees if they did not prevail.
However, with the ban on attorneys' fees, the disincentive to harassing
litigation has been removed. An example from Florida Rural's case files
illustrates this point.
Rose 0 lived in a public housing project with her two children and her
sometimes abusive husband. At one point, she felt the need to obtain a
restraining order against her husband and did so on her own. The order
prohibited the husband from having any contact with the children. When
Rose subsequently allowed him to visit, the housing authority attempted
to evict her for "criminal conduct." Florida Rural represented Rose in
the eviction and had it dismissed on procedural grounds. Under Florida
law,5 Rose was entitled to attorneys' fees, but under the 1996 legislation
Florida Rural was prohibited from seeking them for her. Having lost
nothing in the first attempt, the housing authority filed a new eviction ac-
tion against Rose based on the same facts. This time, the case was re-
solved on the merits, and Rose again prevailed with the help of Florida
Rural. As before, she was entitled to an award of attorneys' fees against
the housing authority, but again none could be sought or collected.
Finally, the housing authority brought a third eviction action against
Rose, on slightly different facts, at a time when Florida Rural did not
have the resources available to represent her. As a result of this war of
attrition, Rose and her children were evicted shortly thereafter.
It is impossible to know with certainty whether an award of attorneys'
fees against the housing authority in the earlier eviction cases would have
produced a more just outcome. However, with an attorney on retainer
and a cheap, routine procedure available, the housing authority had rea-
son to persist, whatever the merits of its case, because such persistence
cost it virtually nothing and was likely to wear down eventually the oppo-
sition. In situations like this, the attorneys' fees restriction will cause the
system to suffer more rather than less litigation, almost always to the det-
riment of the poor.
D. The Problem of Unintended Consequences
The above-described failures of the system of justice for the poor
generally can be described as the intended consequence of the 1996 leg-
islation. However, the implementation of that legislation also has pro-
duced a number of arguably unintended consequences that have in-
50. Florida Bar rules prohibit the use of the client's real name, even though the case is a
matter of public record. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR, Rules 4-1.6 and 4-1.9(b);
Florida Bar Staff Op. 14758 (1990).
51. FLA. STAT. § 83.48 (1998).
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creased the hardship of some poor people. One example is the prohibi-
tion on representing prisoners in any civil litigation. This restriction was
prompted by objections to legal services' representation of prisoners in
jail conditions, overcrowding, and other prisoners' rights cases. However,
the language of the legislation is so broad that it clearly prohibits repre-
sentation in any civil case, whatever its nature.
A recent Florida Rural case illustrates the absurd cruelty of this unin-
tended result.
James came to Florida Rural because his home was in foreclosure.
James had been rendered a quadriplegic as a result of an industrial acci-
dent several years earlier and had used workers' compensation funds to
make a substantial down payment on a specially adapted home. He lived
there independently for some time, but when resolution of his workers'
compensation case was delayed and his income flow interrupted, he fell
behind in his mortgage payments. Attempting to catch up, he was duped
into refinancing his entire mortgage with an unscrupulous loan company.
With a monthly income of $800 and a new mortgage payment of $600, he
was in foreclosure within three months.
A Florida Rural attorney appeared on his behalf, filed the appropri-
ate defenses and counterclaims, and was preparing for mediation when
James was arrested on an unrelated charge. By operation of the restric-
tion on representing prisoners in any litigation, James was to be left
without counsel and subject to default judgment by the loan company's
attorney. The restriction also precluded a pro bono referral, at least pur-
suant to Florida Rural's normal practice of paying litigation costs in pro
bono cases.
This can hardly be a result intended by the drafters of the 1996 legis-
lation; it is, however, a result that has become part of the system of civil
justice for the poor. The 1996 legislation's primary effect-and we be-
lieve its intent-was to further limit the meager access that poor people
previously had to our system of justice and self-governance. In this par-
ticular case, as the Florida Rural attorney was preparing to withdraw,
James was able to plead out the criminal case, and was released from jail.
Representation thus continued and the foreclosure case is headed toward
a favorable outcome. However, the interplay between a minor criminal
infraction and the restriction on prisoner representation very nearly re-
sulted in James losing his home to a predatory loan company. The pub-
lic policy served by this result escapes the authors.
52. 45 C.F.R. § 1637.4 allows LSC-funded litigation to continue if the client's period of in-
carceration is expected to last less than three months.
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E. The Response of Legal Services Programs
Each legal services program faces a clear choice in responding to the
restrictions. Will it resign itself to doing the best it can do for individual
clients under the restrictions, or will it search for new ways to seek re-
dress against the numerous ingrained, often institutionalized, legal
wrongs low-income people encounter? This choice rests on practical de-
cisions about stretching thin resources over a too-large client base rather
than on the tired, false dichotomy between "impact" and "service" cases.
Before the 1996 funding reductions, studies in Florida and other
states concluded that legal services programs had the resources to meet
at most twenty percent of the identified civil legal needs of their client-
eligible populations.53 In response, LSC regulations have for many years
required that programs establish priorities and reasonably distribute
services over their geographic service areas." The regulations further re-
quire that staff, community groups, the private bar, and the client com-
munity be involved in formulating priorities with the final decision to be
made by a program's board of directors. 5' Thus, legal services programs
are required to make regular proactive decisions about how legal services
will be rationed.
Florida Rural serves a fourteen-county area that is larger than the
three southernmost states of New England and has more than a quarter
of a million eligible residents. It receives LSC funding to represent mi-
grant farmworkers throughout the state. Client access to our services
might best be served by placing an office in each community we serve.
However, our staff of seventy leaves too few employees to place even
one advocate, much less an office, in each town. Consequently, a service
delivery plan that relies on clients coming individually to an existing legal
services office is ineffective and almost certainly will not result in an
equal distribution of representation.
Until recently, Florida Rural's response to this problem relied signifi-
cantly on the "wholesale justice" strategies prohibited by the 1996 legisla-
tion. This was because the program's "retail justice" services, such as in-
dividual landlord-tenant and public benefits representation, were difficult
to access from isolated rural communities. For example, relatively few
clients from the town of Arcadia, which is more than sixty miles from any
Florida Rural office, have been represented in landlord-tenant or bene-
fits cases, but large segments of the community benefited from two voting
53. See, e.g., OPENING THE DOORS TO JUSTICE-THE QUEST TO PROVIDE ACCESS FOR
THE POOR IN FLORIDA (Report of the Florida Bar-Florida Bar Foundation Joint Commission
on the Delivery of Legal Services to the Indigent in Florida), Nov. 1991, at 27.




rights cases the program filed against the town and the county and from
the class action and subsequent consent decree affecting the large state
mental hospital in the town. But the 1996 legislation has forced Florida
Rural to look for other strategies to maintain the required balance of
services.
F. Evolving Strategies
One strategy is a renewed emphasis on listening to and working with
our client community through the representation of both embryonic and
full-grown groups.56 For new groups, initial work simply may involve the
preparation of articles of incorporation, bylaws, and board trainings.
Even if nothing further is done for the group in the short term, the re-
sulting relationship gives Florida Rural a new set of eyes and ears in the
community. The reason for a group's formation may highlight a need that
would otherwise be difficult to discover. This approach anticipates that as
the group grows, more issues of importance to the community as a whole
can be expected to come to light. When the group has matured, it will be
able to rely more on its membership. Florida Rural's role will be to pro-
vide legal advice and support for the members' chosen actions.
Florida Rural's work with the Coalition of Immokalee Workers (The
Coalition) offers one example of this approach. The Coalition is an 800-
member, multicultural, community-based organization made up of farm
and other low-wage workers. It is centered in Immokalee, Florida, a
community created from wilderness as a labor camp. The Coalition's
stated purpose is to improve the working conditions and living environ-
ment of both its members and their surrounding communities, and it be-
lieves that meaningful change will only occur through the efforts of the
workers themselves. Florida Rural helped the Coalition incorporate and
attain § 501(c)(3) status as a tax-exempt charitable organization and has
worked with the group over the past three years as an alternative to
Florida Rural's traditional and current representation of individual
farmworkers who have experienced job-related problems.
The ongoing representation of the Coalition has led to a close work-
ing relationship beneficial to both organizations. It has also improved the
lives of many farmworkers in ways that could not have been achieved by
a legal services program representing a single client. Workers have suc-
cessfully campaigned to rein in price-gouging by local merchants by es-
tablishing a non-profit food cooperative, eliminated the reported use of
56. Legal services programs may represent groups that are primarily composed of eligible
clients and have no practical means to retain private counsel. See 45 C.F.R. § 1611.5(c) (1998).
Legal services programs may not engage in "organizing" a group or coalition, but may provide
legal assistance to eligible clients who are engaged in organizing. 45 C.F.R. § 1612.9 (1998).
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violence against workers by marching 400-strong to the home of a feared
offender, and won a twenty-five percent pay increase for over 450 work-
ers from the area's largest tomato grower through a thirty-day hunger
strike that drew national attention.
It is hard to envision how any of these improvements in the lives of
farmworkers could have been achieved through individual client repre-
sentation. The results are primarily due to the Coalition's hard work and
strategic planning. Nonetheless, as general counsel, Florida Rural has
taken an active, though intentionally backstage, role in its representation.
Florida Rural quietly does the Coalition's increasingly complicated cor-
porate work when feasible and recruits outside counsel for matters better
handled by specialists. Florida Rural monitored the Coalition's actions
during the hunger strike, for example, to insure that the campaign was
consistent with the group's corporate and tax-exempt status. By threat-
ening a libel suit at one heated moment during the anti-violence cam-
paign, Florida Rural forced a local newspaper to print a front-page re-
traction of a derogatory article about the Coalition and also the group's
multi-page response. With this approach, as opposed to one based on liti-
gation, the community group conveys its own message.
This approach has produced results that neither Florida Rural nor the
Coalition might have achieved independently. An example is the recent
conviction of a powerful farm labor recruiter on federal peonage charges.
The crew leader and his henchmen had a long history of flagrant mis-
treatment of farmworker employees, including beatings, rape, shootings,
and the stacking of workers in vans for nonstop transportation to South
Carolina. Only through the persistent efforts of Florida Rural was the
Justice Department persuaded to pursue the case. Even so, without the
additional assistance of members of the Coalition in tracking down, in-
terviewing, and gaining the trust of necessary witnesses, the prosecution
would have gone nowhere. Instead, both the labor recruiter and his chief
henchman received fifteen-year federal sentences.
Complaints from minority children and parents regarding mistreat-
ment and substandard programs in the schools triggered an initiative that
teamed Florida Rural with another organization, the National Coalition
of Advocates for Students (NCAS), a lay advocacy group based in Bos-
ton. Supported by a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation, the project tries to improve the opportunities of minority
children in the Palm Beach County public schools. An experienced
Florida Rural civil rights attorney conducted an in-depth investigation of
that school system, uncovering numerous policies and practices that im-
peded the education of African American and Latino children. NCAS
presented this detailed, written report to the community in May of 1998
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and is now working with local parent and community groups and the
board of education to promote public discussion of needed reforms.
Another new approach involves technology. Florida Rural has raised
money to buy video computers for the four counties served by its
Lakeland office. With these machines in place, clients will be able to go
to a location in their own community and see and hear a Florida Rural
advocate on the other end of the telephone line. The advocate simulta-
neously will be able to see and hear the client, and, if necessary, will be
able to operate the client's computer from the Lakeland office. Through
the use of printer/fax machines at each location, documents also will be
exchanged. In this way, both clients and advocates will avoid many of the
long drives that are currently associated with or totally preclude repre-
sentation. Increased representation of the most rural clients should, in
turn, yield cases that reflect different issues than those the program cur-
rently addresses.
The video computers also will give poor people free access to the In-
ternet and a large website to be maintained at Florida Rural's central of-
fice. The website will be largely volunteer-run, and will serve as an elec-
tronic local newspaper with content in English, Spanish and Haitian
Creole. It will provide information and services of specific interest to
community groups and the low-income population, including legal educa-
tion materials and assisted pro se court forms. It will provide members of
the low-income community a chance to design and operate a website.
Merely by designing this community computer project, Florida Rural
has established strong connections with clients and with elements of the
community not often thought of as affiliates. A local county government
and 16cal libraries, for example, are supporting the project.
G. Future Directions
These new alliances suggest the potential for certain gains that cannot
be achieved through a more traditional adversarial approach. The effort
is thus an important one. Nonetheless, some adversarial representation is
inevitable and poses the specter of future conflicts for Florida Rural.
57. This kind of conflict is presented more often than one might think. For example, Florida
Rural was asked not long ago to represent a discharged African-American employee in a dis-
crimination lawsuit against a local news organization that has consistently supported the rights
of the poor in general and the efforts of Florida Rural in particular. Florida Rural undertook the
representation and vigorously litigated the case which eventually settled for over $200,000 and
produced specific reforms in the organization's policies. Although relations between Florida
Rural and the organization have been strained, its positive editorial bent has not changed. The
terms of the settlement prohibit Florida Rural from disclosing the name of the organization.
In another county far removed from the one described above, Florida Rural's application for
funds to match a substantial federal grant was recently denied by a 3-2 vote of the county com-
mission. Among the matters discussed at the public hearing were Florida Rural's litigation
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Moreover, aggressive litigation of client claims, albeit without attorneys'
fees and not as class actions, remains a significant aspect of Florida Ru-
ral's mission. Claims against the local power structures, both formal and
informal, have always advanced with a "full speed ahead, torpedoes be
damned" attitude at Florida Rural, and we have perceived this as a vir-
tue. As the new commitment to making clients part of local decision-
making begins to bear fruit, it remains to be seen whether clients and
staff will have greater difficulty in finding the right balance between con-
frontation and cooperation.
It is still too early to calculate the advantages and drawbacks stem-
ming from our renewed effort to integrate Florida Rural into the sur-
rounding community while maintaining our role as a resource for poor
people with no other access to representation. In many situations, it may
be that we can accomplish as much by collaboration as we did through
opposition. But it may be that the conflicts inherent in this approach
leave too many poor people without meaningful access to legal represen-
tation. A careful and honest examination of these issues will be critical in
determining the direction, and value, of legal services programs under the
most recent wave of restrictions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The experiences of legal services lawyers described in this article illus-
trate how the restrictions and LSC's program integrity regulation impose
intolerable burdens on the work done on behalf of legal services clients
and potential clients:
" LSC's enforcement of the restrictions in New York has interfered
with implementing remedial class action orders.
" LSC has forced lawyers in New York to choose between their cli-
ents and their jobs, to endure substantial costs, and to represent
clients out of "physically separate" office space despite the harsh-
ness inherent in such demands.
* Lawyers in Oregon and Virginia have been forced to waste pre-
cious funds to satisfy LSC's program integrity requirement of
physical and financial separation.
" Lawyers in Oregon have found that LSC's requirement of physi-
cal separation makes it virtually impossible to provide full repre-
sentation to people living in outlying communities.
* Lawyers in Florida have been forced to cease carrying out cru-
cially important activities, particularly on behalf of immigrants,
against agribusiness and its former representation of prisoners in the county jail.
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prisoners, and Florida citizens denied a meaningful opportunity to
vote.
All of these experiences illustrate the need to rescind the restrictions
and the need, at the very least, to modify dramatically the program integ-
rity regulation so that the requirement of physical separation does not in-
terfere with vital work and lead to terrible waste. These stories also illus-
trate the need to investigate further the problems indigent people relying
on free legal services encounter so that the full impact of the restrictions
and the program integrity regulation can be understood and corrective
measures taken.
Courage, passion, and a focused and deliberate effort will be neces-
sary if we are to succeed in obtaining rescission of the restrictions and the
program integrity regulation.
First, in an era characterized by relentless attack on legal services
programs, the programs' employees-those most likely to confront the
impact of the restrictions-are in a vulnerable position. Despite First
Amendment protections, they must worry that the mere act of voicing
concerns about the restrictions could invite criticism from Congress or
LSC. For this reason, many important witnesses may be reluctant to
speak out. Nevertheless, it remains crucially important for all of us to
speak out.
Second, as time passes, it will become increasingly difficult for LSC-
funded programs to recall the details of past legal work. Many senior at-
torneys have left LSC-funded programs due to imposition of the restric-
tions and funding cuts. Thus, many of the best witnesses who could de-
scribe the work done by legal services programs in the past may not be
readily accessible. This makes it all the more important for those who are
still involved in legal services to speak out. Those who are now working
in other non-LSC programs also should help oppose the restrictions.
Third, because LSC programs operate on such tight budgets, such
programs are often unable to send attorneys to conferences like the Li-
man Colloquium. While the Liman Colloquium was well attended by
many of the new organizations that receive foundation, state, and private
funds to represent the poor, relatively few LSC-funded lawyers were able
to attend, in part because of a lack of time and money. The relative isola-
tion and poverty of lawyers in legal services offices should not be permit-
ted to prevent their voices from being heard about the true impact of the
restrictions.
Fourth, the understandable desire to put a happy face on the present
situation also threatens to obscure the reality of how legal services func-
tion under the restrictions. While new ideas are needed to expand fund-
ing for civil legal services and to improve the effectiveness of legal serv-
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ices programs, and while these ideas should be fully developed and im-
plemented as appropriate, a focus on new ideas should not inhibit discus-
sion about the true impact of the restrictions and about strategies to ob-
tain their rescission.
Fifth, for accurate reporting about the impact of restrictions to be ac-
curate, programs will need to be candid in describing cases that they both
have been unable to pursue and unable to refer. Although the restric-
tions explicitly prevent programs from handling some cases, and although
gaps in service are certain to occur when staff become responsible for re-
ferring cases from organization to organization, programs nevertheless
have no real incentive to report either gaps in service or the screw-ups
and miscommunications that they inevitably cause. Yet the gaps that re-
sult from the restrictions and from the pressure to handle cases between
"physically separate" locations must be discussed if the picture is to be
complete.
Sixth, during the Liman Colloquium, LSC's President, John McKay,
said that he considered the LSC restrictions relatively unimportant since
LSC's lawyers continue to handle such a huge volume of important cases
that are not subject to the restrictions. But such a philosophy conceals the
full impact and harmful effect of the restrictions. Before the restrictions,
a single class action, legislative encounter, or challenge to a welfare re-
form statute could have brought greater relief to a larger population than
is now possible. Thus, the importance of the work that can still be done,
and the volume of such work, should not inhibit accurate reporting about
the importance of work that was done in the past, nor should it prevent
us from identifying work that should be done.
Finally, as indicated in the examples from New York, Florida, Ore-
gon, and Virginia that are collected here, it is extremely important to tell
the full story of the restrictions, even though the story remains difficult to
tell. In the end, the legal services programs that demonstrate a commit-
ment both to high-quality representation and to rigorous compliance with
the restrictions will make the best case for rescission of the restrictions.
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